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I. Introduction
The law of who may invoke collateral estoppel and res judicata
has developed in the wrong direction for fifty years, starting with
Bernhard v. Bank of America.I Earlier, the requirement of mutuali-
ty had reigned: only parties or those in privity to the prior action
could invoke the res judicata or collateral estoppel effects of a
judgment.2 Since then most jurisdictions have dropped the mutuali-
ty requirement for collateral estoppel but retained it for res judica-
ta.3 The law should have produced the opposite result: the res
judicata defense should be available to those not parties to the prior
action, but the collateral estoppel issue should not. Recent criticisms
of nonmutual collateral estoppel4 are more likely to be persuasive
1. 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
2. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 131
(1912). The doctrine of mutuality is sometimes phrased as "only those who would be
bound may benefit," but that statement is wrong in at least two circumstances. The
accused in a criminal trial may be estopped by a conviction, even though an acquittal
would not be an estoppel in the accused's favor. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v.
Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Cal. 1962); cf. Standefer v. United States,
447 U.S. 10 (1980) (acquittal of principal does not require acquittal of accessory);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (rejection of illegal search defense in criminal
prosecution can preclude civil claim for illegal search). Similarly, one who secretly
controls litigation may be estopped although unable to invoke an estoppel. Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941); James W.
Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL.
L. REV. 301, 327 (1961).
Parties for purposes of this discussion include not only named parties but also
persons in privity, such as represented persons, see, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (members of class represented in class action suit),
successors in interest, see, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (dictum), and
persons who controlled and were interested in a party's participation in litigation, see,
e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (United States government
financed and directed litigation in Montana state court).
3. 18 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACICE & PROCEDURE § 4463
n.4, § 4464 nn.24-27 (1981, 1992 Supp.).
4. See, e.g., Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67
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if the possible litigation increase from restoring the mutuality
requirement in that context could be offset by the likely litigation
reduction from approving nonmutual res judicata.
Part II of this Article suggests that nonparties should be allowed
to invoke res judicata. A plaintiff would be required to assert claims
against all potential defendants arising from one transaction in the
first action, on pain of losing claims not asserted. This proposed
nonmutual res judicata would be significantly more efficient than is
existing nonmutual collateral estoppel in preventing redundant
litigation, yet it would not greatly change the way litigation is at
present normally conducted.
Part III recommends that nonparties should not be allowed to
invoke collateral estoppel. It demonstrates how none of the policies
advanced to justify nonmutual collateral estoppel-confidence the
first decision was accurate, fairness, promoting litigation efficiency,
or the need for consistency-can withstand careful examination. As
a step in the analysis, this part proposes rejecting the distinction
currently drawn between defensive and offensive collateral estoppel.
It proposes instead distinguishing situations involving one claim or
injury ("mono-claims") from those involving multiple claims or
injuries ("poly-claims").
Part IV shows the weaknesses of the admittedly vast authority
allowing non-parties to invoke collateral estoppel. The strong
reasons for requiring mutuality for collateral estoppel, combined
with the weaknesses of the contrary authorities, suggest it is not too
late to make the change.
TEX. L. REV. 63, 64 (1988) (arguing that nonmutual collateral estoppel does little to
reduce duplicative litigation but creates "an unfair 'option effect' that cannot be
removed without destroying" the effectiveness of collateral estoppel or Due Process
rights of litigants); Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the
Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940 (1992) (demonstrating the
asymmetrical effect of the present rules of issue preclusion).
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II. Res Judicata
"Res judicata," sometimes called "merger" and "bar"5 or
"claim preclusion, '6 provides a defense against new litigation of
claims arising from a transaction that was the subject of prior
litigation. The res judicata defense is available whether the plaintiff
won or lost the prior litigation, whether the prior case had a consent
or default judgment or was litigated on the merits,7 and whether the
new litigation involves the same theories and items of recovery as
the prior case or new ones. For example, if one sues on a contrac-
tual theory for injury to one's arm, a later attempt to proceed with
regard to that same incident on a tort or civil rights theory or to
recover for injury to one's head or shirt will be subject to the
defense of res judicata.'
Res judicata produces a windfall to the party successfully
invoking it. That party need never meet on the merits an opponent's
contention if that contention was omitted from an earlier litigation
between the two involving the same transaction. This occasional
windfall is thought to be less harmful to the operation of the legal
system than it would be to permit a party to bring successive claims
on the same transaction.9
5. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982).
6. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984); Allan
D. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REv. 27, 27-28
(1964).
7. Dismissals for lack of venue or jurisdiction, for failure to join a needed party,
and those specified to be "without prejudice" do not have res judicata effect. FED.
R. Civ. P. 41(b).
8. Res judicata might usefully be compared to Rules 13(a) (requiring, with certain
exceptions, that a defending party assert claims arising out of the same transaction as
the claim being defended) and 19 (requiring joinder of persons needed for complete
relief among those already parties and of persons who might be unfairly prejudiced
if absent or in whose absence present parties might be subject to inconsistent
obligations). Failure to join a party as required by Rule 19 is likely to prevent the
case from going forward. Failure to assert a claim as required by Rule 13(a) or by
res judicata will not prevent the case from going forward but will only preclude a later
assertion of that claim. Thus Rule 13(a) and res judicata merely say, "If not now,
never; but it is your choice whether or not to assert it now." Tactical reasons may
counsel against asserting all available claims in order to simplify or speed up the
litigation, but the cost of adhering to these very sensible tactical considerations is that
the foregone claims may not later be resurrected. A defending party must similarly
choose among available defenses in light of the need for speed and economy.
9. Although doubts have been expressed about the doctrine of res judicata, see,
[Vol. 12:391
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Often the scope of a transaction for res judicata purposes may
be unclear. This uncertainty creates few practical problems,
however, because it may be avoided by asserting all claims which
might possibly be precluded if not asserted. The ease of applying
the doctrine of res judicata may be contrasted with the difficulty
frequently encountered in applying collateral estoppel."0
A. The Current Law: Requirement of Mutuality
The defense of res judicata normally requires mutuality: only
a party to the prior action may assert the defense. Thus a tortfeasor
or an agent cannot invoke res judicata from the plaintiff's prior
action involving the same transaction against another tortfeasor or
the principal.
The rule of mutuality for res judicata has long had two major
exceptions, indemnity relationships and vicarious or derivative
liability. First, a judgment exonerating a person owing a duty to
indemnify can be asserted as res judicata by the nonparty entitled to
be indemnified.11  For example, under the law of agency, the
principal is liable for the torts of an agent committed within the
scope of the agent's employment,12 but the principal has a right to
be indemnified by the agent. 3 A judgment exonerating the agent
may be pleaded as res judicata by the principal. Were the law
otherwise, the agent might be required to indemnify the principal for
a claim the agent had already defeated on the merits, an obvious
e.g., Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948)
(suggesting that while plaintiffs who earlier lost should be barred, those who won
should be allowed to collect additional items of damages or pursue additional theories
of relief upon payment to defendant of any extra costs incurred), it has since been
enthusiastically reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981). Great Britain and other countries
following its legal traditions apply a similar doctrine called "cause of action estoppel."
Garry D. Watson, Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process and Repetitive Litigation: The
Death of Mutuality, in INTERNAnTONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE 179, 181
(I.R. Scott ed., 1990). However, most civil law countries do not have a rule against
splitting a claim. See RUDOLF SCHLESINGER Er AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 454-55 (5th
ed. 1988).
10. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
11. RESrATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 (1942).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
13. Id. § 401.
395
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unfairness to the agent. To shield the agent by denying the principal
the right of indemnification, where the principal has done nothing to
lose this right, would be unfair to the principal unless the principal
were also shielded. Second, and often overlapping the first, a
judgment exonerating a party whose actions allegedly made a
nonparty vicariously or derivatively liable may provide a res judicata
defense to that nonparty.14
It must be emphasized (in a legal system now accustomed to
nonmutual collateral estoppel) that these exceptions to the mutuality
requirement arose in the context of res judicata, not collateral
estoppel.
B. Proposal to Eliminate the Requirement of Mutuality
These ancient exceptions to the mutuality requirement should be
extended to produce a general rule that mutuality is not required for
res judicata. Res judicata should be a defense, not only to claims
against the defendant in the prior case, but also to claims against
persons who could have been made defendants in that case, if the
other requirements for res judicata are met. A person having claims
arising from the same transaction against both agent and principal,
or against alternative defendants, should be required to proceed
against all at once, or forego the claims against those omitted. Thus
the proposal merely encourages (but does not require) joining
defendants; it does not address the thorny issue of requiring joinder
of plaintiffs.1 5
Dropping the mutuality requirement from res judicata will
further the goals of res judicata to promote efficient use of courts,
consistent court decisions, and fairness to litigants.16 First, it is
likely to be as expensive to the court system to relitigate a transac-
tion with a new defendant as with the original one. Another jury
may be required for the second trial, subjecting a second set of
14. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (1942). It may be noted that a similar
doctrine in the common law of felonies-that one cannot be convicted as an accessory
unless the principal has been convicted-has largely been eliminated by statute.
Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2). By
analogy, this exception to mutuality in civil litigation may not continue to be
recognized.
15. See infra note 88.
16. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
396 [V1ol. 12:391
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citizens to the burdens of jury duty, when'the first jury might have
handled the matter. The judge, other court personnel, and the court
facilities would be used to look at the transaction again. The same
witnesses are likely to be used in both trials, inconveniencing them
twice when once should be enough. The costs to society of
uncertainty, of people being unable to transfer or improve property
or otherwise commit their resources because of the risk of litigation,
will continue although a single case could have terminated that
uncertainty if mutuality were not required for res judicata.
Second, allowing a second judgment against a new defendant
creates a risk of inconsistent judgments and consequent reduction in
the prestige and public acceptance of the courts. The risk with
different defendants involved in the multiple judgments is similar to
the risk with one defendant. Thus the first two factors of court
efficiency and decisional consistency strongly suggest res judicata
should not require mutuality.
The third factor of fairness to litigants is less certain. Unlike
the original defendant, a new defendant has not already had to
defend claims growing out of the transaction earlier sued on. The
new defendant might, however, have had to participate in a lesser
way by responding to discovery or appearing as a witness.17
Turning to the opposing party, a plaintiff normally has control over
the litigation, choosing the time, court, parties, and claims.
Nonmutual res judicata would limit these rights. On the other hand,
those rights are already subject to such limits as statutes of limita-
tion, jurisdictional rules, rules about needed parties, and mutual res
judicata. These limits balance the interests of plaintiff, defendant,
and the public. The court system should give little weight to the
plaintiff's tactical interest in proceeding sequentially rather than
concurrently against all potential defendants involved in the same
transaction. It should be noted that current res judicata law would
17. See Edwin H. Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of
Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1969). The defendant in the new action might, in some
scenarios, have been a party to the prior case and thus subjected to both the expense
and risk of litigation, although not the subject of a claim by the plaintiff. For
example, in a prior action by this plaintiff against one potential defendant, the then-
sued defendant might have sought indemnity under Rule 14 from the now-sued
defendant. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Thomasville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 195 S.E.2d
45, 46-47 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 196 S.E.2d 275 (N.C. 1973). Such
a situation would present the strongest case for nonmutual res judicata.
397
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prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a second case merely by finding
another theory against the same defendant, and that nonmutual
collateral estoppel is likely to prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the
same claim against a new defendant. The result should not differ
merely because the plaintiff finds both a new claim and a new
defendant. Plaintiff's slight interest does not outweigh the substan-
tial interest in court efficiency and decisional consistency and the
(admittedly lesser) new defendant's interest in not being troubled
twice by the same transaction, once in discovery as a witness, and
again as a defendant.
Joining all available defendants, as would be strongly encour-
aged by the change proposed here, is well advised under current law
for four reasons. First, because of the existence of the exceptions
to the mutuality requirement for res judicata,18 a litigant who sues
the actor or indemnitor unsuccessfully already risks loss of any claim
against those vicariously liable or entitled to indemnification.
Second, there is the risk of assertion of nonmutual collateral estoppel
by those omitted if the first case is lost. 9 Third is the problem of
litigating against alternatively liable defendants. There may be great
tactical advantages to the plaintiff in having all such defendants in
the same courtroom making the plaintiff's case against each other.
If instead the plaintiff proceeds against only one of the alternatively
liable defendants, the defendant in court will be able to cast blame
on those absent, who will adopt a similar strategy when later haled
into court. The result may be the plaintiff losing all cases even
though it may be clear that one of the defendants should be liable.2"
Finally there is the matter of costs: one litigation is likely to be less
costly to plaintiff or to plaintiff's contingent-fee lawyer than two or
three or more would be. Because of these existing incentives to join
all available defendants, the change in the law of res judicata
proposed here is not likely to change significantly normal practices
under current law.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
19. See infra part 1H.
20. See, e.g., Great Northern Tel. Co. v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 76 N.E.2d
117 (N.Y. 1947) (reversing the denial of plaintiff's motion to join an additional party
defendant against whom alternative relief was sought); see also Watts v. Smith, 134
N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1965) (reversing the denial of plaintiff's attempt to join two
defendants with whom plaintiff had had unrelated accidents the same day).
398 [Vol. 12:391
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There has been very little academic discussion of nonmutual res
judicata, in contrast to the many works on nonmutual collateral
estoppel. The Wright, Miller & Cooper treatise has a thoughtful,
albeit brief analysis of the problem.21 Many other commentators
assume without explanation that res judicata must involve the same
parties,22 an odd assumption in works attacking the idea that
collateral estoppel should involve only the same parties.
There are some developments tending towards nonmutual res
judicata. Although only a few cases expressly apply the doctrine, 3
in quite a number of cases privity has been stretched to achieve the
effect of nonmutual res judicata. 4 In the latter cases, because
21. WRIGHT Er AL. supra note 3, § 4464 nn.24-27. See also Allan D. Vestal,
Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 IowA L. REv. 1, 4-12, 17 (1968) (discussing
exceptions to the mutuality requirement for res judicata and suggesting the exceptions
be expanded); Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968) (explaining that the issue in many cases should be
not whether the second case controls the first through collateral estoppel, but why the
second case should be allowed under res judicata).
22. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
1036, 1043 (1971) ("IT]he rule of merger and bar [exists] as between the same parties
.... "); Linda J. Soldo, Note, Parklane Hosiery: Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
in the Federal Courts, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 509, 509 n.5 (1980) ("[Rles judicata.
• . involves, by definition, the same parties or their privies."); Note, Developments
in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 861-62 (1952). ("[Tlhat strangers
are affected by a judgment... must arise through operation of collateral estoppel;
since a different party is involved in the second action, the 'cause of action' must be
different.").
23. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 143 (1983) (apparently rejecting
dictum to the contrary in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979)); see
also Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding res
judicata to bar a plaintiff from asserting essentially the same claims against different
defendants where the prior and present defendants are closely or significantly related),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 186 (1992); In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6, 10-11
(1st Cir. 1988) (noting that nonmutual claim preclusion is appropriate when "new
defendants have a close and significant relationship with the original defendants");
Gambocz v. Yelencsis, 468 F.2d 837, 842 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that res judicata
applies when sole material change is addition of parties who have close relation to
individuals listed in first suit); Hazzard v. Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 225, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (one not party to prior suit can claim protection of res judicata if
prior party to action had full and fair opportunity to contest the issues), aftd, 519
F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. See, e.g., Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d
1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1989) (agent is in privity with principal in action for damages);
Scott v. Fort Bend County, 870 F.2d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1989) (judge defendant
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typically some employees of a corporation or government agency are
treated as being in privity with other employees or the entity, the
employees sued in the second case can invoke res judicata from the
first case won by the other defending employees or by the entity.
While such a rule is unexceptionable when the actions are for
injunctions binding the employee in the scope of employment and
thus effectively binding the agency,' that approach seems clearly
wrong when the actions are for damages payable by the sued
employee. Surely one employee's loss should not be available as
estoppel against another employee who had no contact with the prior
case. These cases seem to reflect judicial receptivity to the basic
fairness and efficiency of nonmutual res judicata. It would be better
if litigants were expressly warned that this new doctrine is the law.
It is dangerous to stretch privity to accomplish this end, as opinions
so written26 may be used as precedent in other areas such as
estoppel where they would be unfair.
is in privity with successor judge) (alternative holding); Henry v. Farmer City State
Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (officers, directors, and employees
in privity with bank are protected by res judicata); Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377,
1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (privity between federal employees and the office they work for
sufficient to apply res judicata); Fiumara v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 746 F.2d 87,
92 (lst Cir. 1984) (insurance company employees in privity with company, res
judicata bars subsequent suit on claim argued in prior trial); Kutzik v. Young, 730
F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984) (university faculty and administrators in privity with
university bars subsequent suit on same claim); Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845,
850 (7th Cir.) (government and its officers in privity for resjudicata purposes), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1983); Ruple v. City of Vermilion, 714 F.2d 860, 862 (8th
Cir.) (government and its officers in privity), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1983);
Micklus v. Greer, 705 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir. 1983) (government and its officers in
privity for res judicata purposes).
25. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403
(1940) (holding that litigation involving one representative of the United States is
binding on other agents of the United States).
26. See the following cases finding privity (with little analysis) contrary to the
suggestion in the text: Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1382 & n.13 (11th Cir.
1982) (prison officials sued in individual capacity are estopped by prior class action
against prison system, although they were not parties to earlier action), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 932 (1983); Heller v. Plave, 743 F. Supp. 1553, 1561-62 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(IRS agents sued in individual capacity are estopped by determination, made in setting
aside criminal conviction, that government witness had committed perjury); Hann v.
Carson, 462 F. Supp. 854, 860-63 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (deputy sheriff's individual
liability for damages was determined by estoppel from prior action against sheriff in
official capacity).
400
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A change such as that proposed here might be made more fairly
by amending Rules 18 through 20 (dealing with joinder of claims
and parties)27 or by other legislative or administrative action, rather
than by judicial decision, to avoid unfairly surprising those who have
relied on res judicata retaining its present form. Alternatively, if the
change is made judicially, it might be limited to judgments rendered
(or cases commenced) a reasonable period of time after the new
doctrine is announced.28
A rule eliminating mutuality as a requirement for res judicata
will not always require a plaintiff to join multiple defendants on peril
of losing the claim against those foregone. Sometimes limits of
personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or venue will
preclude assembling all defendants, particularly in cases where the
first claim is asserted not by filing a complaint but rather under
Rules 13 and 14.29 Res judicata has long provided an exception for
the parts of the transaction foreclosed by jurisdictional limitations,"
and that exception should continue if res judicata is applied without
the mutuality requirement.31
27. For example, one might add at the end of Rule 18:
(c) Required Joinder. A party asserting any claim must assert any other
claim over which the court has jurisdiction arising out of the transaction,
or relating to the property, that is the subject of the claim asserted, whether
those other claims are against the same opponent, another party, or a
nonparty. Claims not asserted as required by this rule may not be asserted
in any other litigation. A party asserting a claim shall inform the court if
the claim has already been asserted in another proceeding.
28. See Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 476 A.2d 250, 253 (N.J. 1984). The
retroactivity problem presented in regard to res judicata may be different from that in
other contexts. Cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443
(1991) (discussing the retroactivity problem). As an internal judicial matter, the courts
may be freer to adopt rules as a matter of policy, rather than "find" them. Cf Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 229 (1946) (creating new guidelines for jury
selection as part of the Court's supervisory power over federal courts); HENRY HART
& ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss 1412-13 (Tentative ed. 1958) (noting that
courts have more leeway in interpreting statutes addressed to in-court activities than
to those addressed to out-of-court activities).
29. Rule 13 authorizes asserting cross-claims and counterclaims. Rule 14 permits
a defendant to assert claims against a third party "not a party to the action who is or
may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
the third-party plaintiff." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
30. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(c) (1982).
31. See Gargiul v. Tompkins, 790 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1986). Those beyond
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Similarly, although nonmutual res judicata would encourage the
plaintiff to join all potentially liable defendants subject to the court's
jurisdiction, the power to sever under Rule 42 would be available to
prevent trials from becoming too complicated.
Where the defendants are kept out of the first courtroom by
jurisdictional problems or by the judge severing the cases against
them, they should.-contrary to present law-be unable to invoke the
victory of the defendant in the first trial as nonmutual collateral
estoppel, for reasons to which we now turn.
III. Collateral Estoppel
"Collateral estoppel," sometimes called "issue preclusion," 32
precludes relitigation in a subsequent case of an issue that was
actually litigated, decided, and necessary to the judgment in a prior
case between the same parties.33 Thus collateral estoppel can apply
only to litigated cases, not to judgments produced by default or
settlement, and it applies only to issues necessarily decided, not to
issues omitted nor to issues which were raised and decided but not
necessary to the judgment. By analogy to the concepts of dictum
and holding under our system of precedent, those matters necessarily
decided are thought to be more reliable because they will have
received the parties' and the judge's or jury's full attention and
because they may be subject to appeal. As an additional safeguard,
the person subject to collateral estoppel will be allowed to show that
the first case in some manner did not produce a full and fair
opportunity to litigate.3 4
the court's jurisdiction would likely continue to be able to invoke the existing
exceptions to mutuality for those entitled to indemnity and perhaps for those
vicariously liable. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
32. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984);
see also Allan D. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 464 (1981).
33. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 351 (1876); Russell v. Place, 94
U.S. 606, 608 (1876). 1
34. Great Britain and countries following its legal traditions have a doctrine
similar to collateral estoppel called "issue estoppel." Robert C. Casad, Issue
Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 62-63
(1984). Issue estoppel may extend to issues admitted as well as those litigated,
contrary to the practice in the United States. Compare Vestal, supra note 32, at 473-
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Collateral estoppel may be invoked only against parties to the
first action and persons in privity with them. Traditionally the law
of collateral estoppel required mutuality: because only parties could
be bound, only parties could invoke the benefits of the judgment."
Thus, if one were to sue a principal unsuccessfully, the issues
decided in that case would not be collateral estoppel if the same
person were later to sue the agent. Similarly, if several people were
injured by the same airplane crash, one victim's victory in court
could not be invoked by the other victims as collateral estoppel on
the issues.
Over the last half century the mutuality requirement has been
dropped from collateral estoppel by many jurisdictions. 6 The
earliest cases renouncing mutuality typically involved "defensive" or
"shield" collateral estoppel, where one person had one claim which
might be collected from various parties, as in the example above of
the principal and agent."7 Thus issues necessarily decided in
74 (arguing that opportunity to litigate an issue should ordinarily result in preclusion
as to the issue) with Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Revisiting the Second Restatement of
Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, .66 CORNELL L. REv. 564, 576-84
(1981) (criticizing Professor Vestal's "opportunity" theory). Although in theory Great
Britain and Canada continue to require mutuality, nonmutual issue estoppel may
effectively be allowed through the defense of "abuse of process." Garry D. Watson,
Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process and Repetitive Litigation: The Death of Mutuality,
in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE 179-215 (I.R. Scott, ed., 1990).
Legal systems in France, Germany, Argentina, Japan, Sweden and Mexico have
only the most narrow use of collateral estoppel. Casad, supra, at 63-69. Those
systems normally apply estoppel only to the matters expressly declared in the
judgment, not to findings necessary to the judgment, and limit the estoppel to the same
cause of action. Id. at 69. Recall that civil law systems generally have no rule
against splitting a claim, see, e.g., SCHLESINGER Er AL., supra note 9, at 454-55, so
it is possible to have multiple litigation on the same cause of action. Something like
collateral estoppel can be achieved by either party seeking a declaratory judgment as
to a particular issue. Casad, supra, at 70. This narrow approach to collateral
estoppel has less impact in civil law systems than it would here because the judge
(civil systems do not use juries) is free to use the record of another action between the
same parties, including the findings, as evidence. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note
9, at 456.
An interesting tracing of the origins of collateral estoppel and res judicata may
be found in Robert W. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res
Judicata, 35 U. ILL. L. REv. 41 (1940).
35. See supra note 2.
36. See supra note 3.
37. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950) (using the term
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unsuccessful litigation against either agent or principal could be
invoked by the other in subsequent litigation brought by the common
claimant. Later cases would similarly reject mutuality in applying
"offensive" or "sword" collateral estoppel, where many unrelated
persons had related but separate claims against one defendant, as in
the example above of the claims growing out of the airplane
crash.38
This Article proposes to restore the mutuality requirement for
collateral estoppel. To discuss mutuality in the context of collateral
estoppel will be more illuminating if one separates three typical
situations. First, one injury or claim might permit litigation against
several different defendants, either jointly, severally, or in the
alternative. These might be called "mono-claims." An example
would be a person injured in a car wreck who might have claims
against the drivers involved, their employers, the vehicle owners,
and those who manufactured or maintained the vehicles. Second,
several related but separate injuries or claims may involve one or
more common parties on one side and on the other side several
unrelated parties. These might be called "poly-claims." Examples
would include a stock seller pursued by many purchasers of the same
stock issue, an airline pursued by many victims or their families for
the same accident, and a patent owner pursuing claims against many
who similarly infringed the same patent. Third, the first action
might involve government enforcement and the subsequent actions
might be by private parties for civil remedies. As the following
discussion will demonstrate, considering these three situations is
more useful than using the commonly drawn distinction between
defensive and offensive collateral estoppel.
"res judicata" but apparently meaning collateral estoppel); Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942); Coca Cola Co.
v. Pepsi Cola Co., 172 A. 260 (Del. 1934).
38. Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev. 1962),
aff'd in part & modified in part sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d
379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines v. United States, 379 U.S.
951 (1964).
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A. Mono-Claims: One Claim Against Multiple Defendants
The earliest rejections of mutuality as a requirement for
collateral estoppel occurred in cases in which one claim could be
asserted against multiple defendants. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi
Cola Co.,"9 Coca-Cola had unsuccessfully sued three of Pepsi
Cola's retail distributors for substituting Pepsi Cola products when
a customer ordered Coca-Cola products. Coca-Cola then asserted
essentially the same claim against Pepsi Cola. In Bernhard v. Bank
of America,40 beneficiaries of an estate had first unsuccessfully
objected that the administrator had wrongfully taken money belong-
ing to the estate. The beneficiaries then sought to assert essentially
the same claim against the bank which had honored the
administrator's transfer of funds from the estate. Although these
cases were decided on the grounds of nonmutual collateral estoppel,
they could both have been decided within the well-recognized
exceptions to res judicata's mutuality requirement where the first
case exonerated the indemnitor or the actor and the second case was
asserted against the indemnitee or person vicariously liable.41
Such cases may present a strong case for nonmutual collateral
estoppel, but that point need not be addressed if as recommended
above res judicata is freed from the requirement of mutuality. One
should ask, should the common party be allowed another opportunity
in court by discovering both a new issue and a new opponent, when
conventional res judicata would preclude that party's going forward
merely by discovering a new issue (the parties remaining the same),
and collateral estoppel (in its present nonmutual form) would
preclude that party going forward on the issue lost previously merely
because another party is found? The policy of requiring those
asserting claims to assert all those arising from one transaction
provides a sensible answer here, if as recommended above the rule
is not limited to those sued in the first case but rather is extended to
include others possibly liable for claims growing out of that same
transaction.
In three major respects res judicata would be more effective than
collateral estoppel in discouraging unnecessary litigation. First, res
39. 172 A. 260 (Del. 1934).
40. 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
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judicata can be applied against the winner in the prior case as well
as against the loser, where collateral estoppel normally applies only
against the prior loser.42 Second, collateral estoppel applies only
to issues necessary to the first judgment. Those issues may not be
dispositive of the second case (e.g., the second case might involve
a theory of recovery different from that asserted in the first case).
Finally, most cases are ultimately resolved by settlement, so have no
collateral estoppel effect. There may be significant expense and
disruption caused a person merely by the receipt of a summons and
complaint, and of course significant expense and disruption are the
norm if there are extensive pretrial motions and discovery, even
though the case is not ultimately decided by trial on the merits. It
is because of these costs that res judicata applies to cases resolved
short of trial. Res judicata without mutuality will do a better job of
controlling such costs than will collateral estoppel without mutuality.
In addition to being more effective, res judicata is easier to
apply, involving only a determination of whether a prior case
involved the same transaction as does this case, and whether this
case would have been within the prior court's jurisdiction. To apply
nonmutual collateral estoppel is often very difficult. One must
determine whether the issue in the second case is the same as that in
the first,43 whether the issue was decided in the first case and
necessary to the first case's judgment (an inquiry made more
difficult if the first case was decided by a general verdict), and
whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the first case.' Such
42. Collateral estoppel might be applied against the winner of the prior case if
litigation postures change in the second case. For example, an employee in the first
case might seek to establish permanent disability in order to receive compensation,
then try in a second case to establish excellent health in order to obtain reinstatement.
Gibson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 314 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Tex. 1970) (finding this
argument inapplicable on the facts), rev'd on other grounds, 441 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.
1971).
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982)
(indicating the complexity of determining whether issues are the same).
44. See supra note 32. Several factors may indicate that the first case provided
less than a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (explaining that there is fair opportunity where
subsequent suits were foreseeable, previous judgment was not inconsistent with any
previous decision, and no procedural opportunities were available in the second action
that were unavailable in the first); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29
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inquiries are difficult and uncertain, providing great potential for
delay at trial and reversal on appeal. Although required to apply
collateral estoppel fairly, such inquiries are not required to apply res
judicata.
Thus nonmutual collateral estoppel should not be necessary in
the situation where it originated, where one claim is collectible from
multiple parties, because nonmutual res judicata would provide an
easier and more effective solution to this problem. This discussion
turns now to a situation where nonmutual collateral estoppel is likely
to be unfair.
(1982) (noting that consideration should be given to the following factors: whether
treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with the scheme
of remedies, procedural opportunities not available in the first action, inconsistent
determinations, prior determination may have been affected by relationship among
parties or was a compromise verdict, treating issues as conclusively determined may
complicate determination of other issues, the issue is one of law, other compelling
circumstances); Hazard, supra note 22, at 1044 (noting that consideration should be
given to the sum involved in the first case, the burden of proof, whether the prior
result was a compromise, newly discovered evidence, the party seeking preclusion
could have participated in the prior action, the first result is inconsistent with that
reached as to others similarly situated); Janet S. Ellis, Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the
Fairness out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L. REV. 563, 578 (1980) (explaining that
a court will deny collateral estoppel if the original suit did not give a procedural
opportunity that was both full and fair); Note, Civil Procedure-Collateral Estoppel,
63 MARQ. L. REV. 114, 125-26 (1979) (noting that the factors which will prevent the
use of issue preclusion are: the sum involved in the first case, foreseeability of the
second action, potential inconsistency of prior determination with previous judgments,
whether the second action affords procedural opportunities unavailable in the first
action, whether the prior judgment involved comparative fault or was a compromise
verdict, incompatibility with a particular remedial scheme, lack of opportunity or
incentive to obtain appellate review). The particular problenis posed by the second
plaintiff who might perhaps have been in the first case are discussed in Ratliff, supra
note 4, at 84-87, Bruce Kempkes, Issue Preclusion: Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
Revisited, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 111 (1981) (both suggesting Parklane's strictures against
allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel to those who avoid joining the first action are
not very rigorously enforced), and Alan J. Statman, The Defensive Use of Collateral
Estoppel in Multidistrict Litigation after Parklane, 83 DICK. L. REV. 469 (1979)
(suggesting denial of nomnutual collateral estoppel to those who block transfers which
are sought in order to consolidate). The extremes to which an inquiry into the fairness
of the prior proceeding can lead are suggested by Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D.
378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing depositions of jurors in prior state case).
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
B. Poly-Claims: Separate but Related Claims, Unrelated Parties
The second situation to which nonmutual collateral estoppel
might be applied concerns a common party with separate but related
claims involving unrelated parties. Examples here fall into two
broad categories, those involving multiple claimants and those
involving multiple defendants. The multiple claimant problem is
typified by the airplane crash with multiple unrelated victims and by
the securities fraud with multiple unrelated buyers. The multiple
defendant problem is typified by the owner of a copyright, trade-
mark, or patent who may have claims against multiple unrelated
infringers. We will begin with the multiple claimant problem.
1. Multiple Claimants.-This category is commonly called
offensive or sword nonmutual collateral estoppel. In a multiple
claimant problem such as an airplane crash, plaintiffs are not
required to join under Rule 19, and in many cases there will be
several state and federal courts available, so that consolidation of the
related cases may be difficult or impossible."a Under nonmutual
collateral estoppel, the common party's loss of the first case may be
available to all the other claimants as an estoppel of the common
party on issues which may be dispositive, yet a victory by the
common party cannot be used against the other claimants because of
the limitations of the Due Process Clause.46 Thus the common
party in litigating the first case can win no more than that case, but
the common party may lose all the cases.
The following subsections argue that nomnutual collateral
estoppel cannot be justified in this context. The risk of inaccuracy
in litigation is too high to let us justify estoppel by confidence that
the first result is likely to have been correct. The basis for accepting
litigation results, fair risk allocation rather than accuracy, does not
apply to the second claimant who did not participate in the risks of
the first proceeding. Any litigation efficiency from such estoppel is
more apparent than real, and in any event cannot justify the
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1982) allows cases pending in different federal district
courts to be transferred to one federal district court for pretrial, but it does not apply
to trials or to cases pending in state courts.
46. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (citing
Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) and
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
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unfairness. Nor does a refusal to permit such estoppel create too
great a risk of judicial inconsistency. Even adding a few more
arguments cannot tip the scales in favor of offensive nonmutual
collateral estoppel.
a. First Case Accurate?.-Can nonmutual collateral
estoppel be justified on the ground that the first result was accurate?
One can find many statements suggesting that a fairly tried case
should produce a correct result. For example, the United States
Supreme Court in its justification for applying collateral estoppel
stated that it was "assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in
the first suit."47 Similarly the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
"[T]he very notion of collateral estoppel demands and assumes a
certain confidence in the integrity of the end result of our adjudica-
tive process. There is no foundation . . . for . . . the suggestion
that a decision rendered after full and fair presentation. . . might be
decided differently in another go-round."4" Academic commentary
is often along the same lines.49
47. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of IlI. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971). In a similar vein, the Court later stated that it was "assuming that a perfectly
sound judgment of invalidity has been rendered," and that "[t ]ie patentee is expending
funds on litigation to protect a patent which is by hypothesis invalid," id. at 338, and
that "the claims are in fact invalid." Id. at 346. The standard Blonder-Tongue adopts
does not require that the prior decision be correct (as the Court earlier presumed) but
merely that "the prior case was [not] one of those relatively rare instances where the
courts wholly failed to grasp the technical subject matter." Id. at 333. Blonder-
Tongue is discussed in part IV.D. Along the same optimistic lines, the Court stated
in Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 n.18 (1979), "[t]he estoppel doctrine,
however, is premised upon an underlying confidence that the result achieved in the
initial litigation was substantially correct," although the Court later more realistically
stated, "[tihis case does no more than manifest the simple, if disconcerting, reality that
'different juries may reach different results under any criminal statute.'" Id. at 25
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957)). Roth's statement
also seems applicable to judges and to civil statutes.
48. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 550
P.2d 1185, 1190 (Or. 1976).
49. "[I]f the factfinder has a complete case before it, there is no reason to suspect
error." Note, Parklane Hosiery-Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in the Federal
Courts, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 509, 525 (1980). Collateral estoppel is justified in part
"by underlying confidence that the result reached is substantially correct." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. f (1982). "If a verdict in a single trial of
a criminal case is sufficient to send the defendant to the gallows, it is difficult to see
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Despite this authority, two factors establish that collateral
estoppel is not premised on the accuracy of the first determination.
First, one met with an assertion of collateral estoppel, while allowed
to show that in some manner the first determination was unfair, will
not be allowed to show that it was erroneous.50 Second, there can
be little doubt that many cases are decided incorrectly. As
Ecclesiastes reminds us, "the race is not to the swift, nor the battle
to the strong, [nor the result of litigation to the just,] . . . but time
and chance happeneth to them all." 5 Justice Jackson's statement
about the United States Supreme Court, "[w]e are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final, "52
would seem applicable to all decisions by the courts. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that collateral estoppel "renders
white that which is black, and straight that which is crooked." 3
Others have described litigation as a "sublimated, regulated brawl,
why a verdict in a single trial of a civil case should not be taken as reliable enough
to dispose, in whole or in part, of related claims." Maurice J. Holland, Modernizing
Res Judicata, 55 IND. L.J. 615, 628 n.33 (1980). Of course many commentators do
harbor doubts about the death penalty on the ground that trials are not infallible, even
with the extra procedural safeguards for criminal trials generally and capital cases in
particular. See cases cited infra note 65 (debating the likelihood of erroneous
executions). If executions are to occur there seems little alternative to a trial, whereas
in all invocations of collateral estoppel there is always the realistic alternative of a
second trial. "IT]he new model of judgments and due process which follows from
Parklane permits 'issues' to emerge as free-floating, independent entities, and views
trials as experiments concerning the merits of the 'issues' they comprise." Laurence
C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity, 32 STAN. L. REv. 655, 657 (1980). One may
wonder whether the justices who decided Parklane would accept that statement.
50. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28 & 29 cmt. j (1982)
(discussing the basis for issue preclusion and noting that a court must consider the
totality of circumstances when deciding whether issue preclusion is fair) with § 17
cmt. d (noting that general rules on issue preclusion apply even if the judgment is
erroneous because the original party's remedy is to get the original judgment set aside
or reversed).
51. Ecclesiastes 9:11 (Oxford-Cambridge ed., 1885).
52. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
result). Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in, reaffirming the mutuality requirement
for collateral estoppel stated, "[tihe major risk [in applying collateral estoppel] ...
is that of an erroneous determination in the first case." Goodson v. McDonough
Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 986 (Ohio 1984).
53. Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859). But cf. Ecclesiastes
1:15 (Oxford-Cambridge ed., 1885) ("That which is crooked cannot be made straight
. ... ") (emphasis omitted).
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a private battle conducted in a court-house," 54 and as "not a
laboratory experiment for the discovery of physical laws of universal
application but a means of settling a dispute between litigants. ""
Although we are committed to a litigation process which is fair,
accurate, and efficient, it is clear that many cases could be decided
either way. This is so because a variety of mechanisms discourage
trials of cases or defenses lacking merit. First, many possible cases
could easily be disposed of by a motion on the pleadings under Rule
12(b)(6), 12(c), or 12(). 56 Such claims or defenses, as the case
may be, are unlikely to be asserted, and in any event such pleadings
motions are unlikely to give rise to collateral estoppel. Second,
other possible cases might be resolved on a motion for summary
judgment,57 so one would expect many such claims or defenses not
to be asserted, or to be easily resolved. Third, claims and defenses
passing both the prior hurdles are still subject to sanctions under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, Rule 11 or Rules 36 and 37(c), or under the court's
inherent power,5" which should also help to weed out those lacking
54. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JusTIcE 7 (1949).
55. Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir.
1943).
56. Rule 12(b)(6) allows the defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted" to be raised in a pre-answer motion or in the answer. Rule 12(f)
authorizes a motion to strike "any insufficient defense,' and thus can be the plaintiff's
equivalent of defendant's motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(c) allows a motion for
judgment on the pleadings by either party-. These Rule 12 motions generally accept
the factual accuracy of the pleadings and test only their legal sufficiency.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
In addition, a claim brought informa pauperis may be dismissed if its averments are
irrational or wholly incredible, even though sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988); Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728 (1992). A
decision under Rule 56 or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) might have collateral estoppel
effect.
58. Section 1927 allows a court to impose on an attorney the excess costs,
expenses, and attorney's fees that the attorney caused by unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplying the proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980). Under Rule 11, a party
whose actions are not "well grounded in fact and... warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"
may be required to pay the opposing party's "reasonable expenses . . . including a
reasonable attorney's fee" incurred in resisting those actions. Rules 36 and 37(c)
authorize a request to admit a matter conclusively for the purposes of the present
action only. The sanction for one who refuses to admit material matters without
having "reasonable grounds to believe that he might prevail on the matter" is to pay
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 12:391
merit. It is only the cases surviving the threat of these three
measures that are litigated. A large but unknowable proportion of
the cases which are litigated (the cases which might be invoked as
collateral estoppel) thus have enough merit on both sides that they
could fairly be decided either way.
Not only does the court system accept that many questions could
be decided either way, it also insists that decisions that are probably
erroneous be accepted. A jury will be allowed to return a verdict,
rather than have judgment entered as a matter of law, so long as the
evidence is such that a reasonable person could arrive at the jury's
verdict, even if that verdict is probably wrong.59  A judge's
findings of fact must be accepted even though they are probably
wrong, so long as they are not clearly erroneous.6" Similarly, an
exercise of discretion may have a substantial impact on the outcome
of a case, yet that exercise of discretion will not be reversed in the
absence of clear abuse.61 The preceding examples concern direct
review; once there is a final judgment the grounds of collateral
attack are much more severely restricted.62 Such rules of deference
to jury, judge, and judgment show that while the court system
his opponent's "reasonable expenses . . . including reasonable attorney's fees" of
proving the matter. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991), upholds
federal courts' inherent power to sanction litigants for bad faith conduct.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 50; Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969)
(en bane). On a lesser showing a new trial might be ordered. See FED. R. CIV. P.
59.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
564, 573 (1985) (discussing appellate court's reluctance to interfere with lower court's
fact-finding); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
61. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion in the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635 (1971). Also, any decision made under the burden
of proof rules, which tell the finder of fact what to do if unable to determine what
actually occurred, has a substantial chance of being erroneous. Here, however, while
the result may be erroneous, a consistent application of the burden of proof rules will
at least produce consistent decisions, unlike consistent application of the rules of
deference to jury and judge. Similar to the burden of proof rules are rules of evidence
which serve policies other than maximizing the accuracy of the truth determining
process, such as the privilege protecting communications between spouses. They may
produce the wrong answer, but they should do so consistently.
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394 (1981) (holding that the resjudicata consequences of a final, unappealedjudgment
based on an erroneous view of the law is not open to collateral attack and must be
corrected on direct appeal).
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considers accuracy an important goal, accuracy must be balanced
with, and sometimes subordinated to, other goals.
A variety of observations confirm this obvious truth that many
civil cases could fairly be decided either way. For example,
although many procedural protections in criminal cases protect
privacy interests, other protections such as requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt assure that those accused in criminal cases are
not falsely convicted. Would those latter protections be necessary
if civil trials were normally accurate? Second, sophisticated clients
spend vast sums retaining able attorneys because the clients believe
that such expenditures increase the chances of success in litigation.
Similarly, able and experienced attorneys research and analyze and
rehearse, then re-research and re-analyze and re-rehearse, because
they believe that such efforts increase the chances of success.63
Further, those who have watched many trials are often unable to
predict the outcome when the jury or judge retires to decide the
case, suggesting that even at that late stage of the trial the case could
still be decided fairly either way.'
Unfortunately it is hard. to imagine a practical method to
determine how often court decisions are incorrect.6 5 Two further
observations suggest that inaccuracy is likely. First, erroneous
rulings of law are common enough that our society maintains
63. "[A]s any trial lawyer will admit, proper preparation is the be all and end all
of trial success." Louis NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT 8 (1961). Cf. David M. Cutler
& Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress:
Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157, 167 (1988)
(estimating that after-tax legal fees in the litigation between Texaco and Pennzoil over
the acquisition of Getty Oil may have been $525 million; based on the 34% corporate
income tax rate, the total cost may have been $800 million).
64. "[1]f there was anything God Almighty didn't know, it was what verdict a
jury was going to bring in in a given case." RICHARD HARRIS, BEFORE AND AT
TRIAL 206 (James M. Kerr ed., 1st Am. ed., Northport, N.Y., Edward Thomson Co.
1890). C. Michael 0. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in
the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 309 (1975) (suggesting that many who
plead guilty would hot be convicted, perhaps suggesting the indeterminacy of trial
generally).
65. See the inconclusive debate on the likelihood of erroneous executions. Hugo
A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases,
40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987); Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the
Innocent. A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1988);
Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman
and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988).
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systems of appellate courts, and these courts frequently reverse trial
court rulings in cases that are appealed. One might expect errors on
factual questions to occur with at least similar frequency; the
determinations of law are made by judges trained in the law, where
fact determinations may be made by jurors lacking formal training
in fact-finding. Second, a crude indication that error is likely
emerges from perhaps the three leading cases on nonmutual
collateral estoppel.6 Each involved a first case which was allowed
to be used as collateral estoppel although it was inconsistent with
another case and thus arguably decided incorrectly. In Bernhard v.
Bank of America,67 a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Traynor, the trial judge in the second case initially held against the
bank on the merits before reconsidering the res judicata/collateral
estoppel issue and resolving it in the bank's favor.68 Zdanok v.
Glidden,69 a unanimous opinion written by Judge Friendly, applied
collateral estoppel from a decision whose correctness the trial court
in the second case doubted70 and which would be overruled unani-
mously by an en banc court four years later.71 In Blonder- Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,7" a unani-
mous opinion written by Justice White, a first decision invalidating
a patent was held to be collateal estoppel although the trial court in
the case on appeal found the patent valid.73
66. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971); Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
67. 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
68. The record on appeal in Bernhard contains a minute order dated January 19,
1940, ordering judgment for the plaintiff. Record at 298, Bernhard v. Bank of
America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942) (No. 13023) (on file with author and available at
the Legal Information Center, Hastings College of the Law). A minute order dated
March 5, 1940 vacated the prior minute order and ordered judgment for the defendant
on the grounds of the prior decision. Id. The difference in rulings was based on the
decision in Waterland v. Superior Court, 98 P.2d 211 (Cal. 1940), decided January
15, 1940, but probably not available to the trial court when it first ruled, clearing up
a point of probate court jurisdiction in California.
69. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
70. Id. at 949.
71. Local 1251, United Auto Workers of America v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,
405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
72. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
73. Id. at 350. The patent was ultimately declared invalid on remand.
University of Ill. Found. v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill.
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The indeterminacy of litigation was graphically demonstrated
when one case was simultaneously tried to five juries and produced
quite divergent answers to special interrogatories.74
Would the argument presented above suggest we replace trials
with a system of coin flips? Of course not. The argument is that
we should make allowances for the unavoidable uncertainty of
human attempts to determine past events, not that uncertainty is
desirable. We should seek the greatest accuracy that can be
achieved at reasonable cost, with reasonable promptness, in light of
such other values as protecting privacy. But we should not be so
proud of our judicial systems' efforts to achieve accuracy that we
mislead ourselves into believing that they normally succeed. We
should not put the results of litigation to uses that could be justified
only if the results could confidently be expected to be accurate.
If decisions are too often inaccurate to be accepted for
nonmutual collateral estoppel, why should their results be accepted
even in the first case (other than because they may be enforced by
the coercive power of the government)? There are three reasons.
First, the alternative to accepting court decisions is either suffering
injuries without redress or resorting to self-help with the risk of
escalating retaliations.' One accepts one's losses in court because
one expects other cases to produce victories. Second, the court
systems do make a major effort to produce accurate results, and this
effort deserves respect even though accuracy may often not be
achieved. Viewed another way, to demand infallibility from fallible
mortals as a precondition to accepting court's decisions would
1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061
(1972). In addition to the cases discussed in the text, one might also note that the
patent involving the direct-oxygen method of steel manufacturing, surely one of the
most important industrial processes in the middle of the twentieth century, was
invalidated by nonmutual collateral estoppel from a decision which seems
hypertechnical, despite a careful decision by the trial judge in the second case finding
the patent valid. Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
74. Michail D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its
Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141,
221-24 app. (1984). See also Ratliff, supra note 4, at 91 n.173 (1988) (same case
tried to four juries produced inconsistent results).
75. Without civil order, life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651). '
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preclude having courts.76 Finally, court decisions should be
accepted as gambles or risk allocations, the subject of the following
discussion.
b. Faimess?.-Is nonmutual collateral estoppel fair to the
party estopped? A necessary condition for the application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel is that the party estopped must have
had a full and fair opportunity to establish its position in regard to
that issue.' Moreover, because that party is on notice under
existing precedents that there is a substantial risk of being
nonmutually estopped, it cannot claim unfair surprise. That these
possible sources of unfairness have been eliminated does not make
the process fair, however, because there remains a fundamental
problem.
That nonmutual collateral estoppel is unfair emerges from the
fact that litigation involves a substantial element of chance, that the
results of litigation run a substantial risk of being inaccurate. If the
results of litigation were assured to be accurate, it would be hard to
argue that estopping the common party or even a stranger to the first
case would be unfair.78 Once the likelihood of inaccurate litigation
76. It has been argued that the importance of the court lies, not in the capacity
for finding the factual truth, but rather in the fact that it gives individuals an
opportunity to participate in protecting their rights. "[P]reclusion is not ... based on
the proposition that a question is foreclosed because we already know 'the truth.' I
do not think we have enough confidence in the judicial process, or, indeed, in the
verifiability of an assertion of historical fact through any process, to justify such an
explanation." David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70
IOWA L. REV. 27, 45 (1984). "Courts can only do their best to determine the truth
on the basis of the evidence, and the first lesson one must learn on the subject of res
judicata is that judicial findings must not be confused with absolute truth." Brainerd
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REV. 281, 315 (1957).
77. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979).
78. See George, supra note 49, at 657 (arguing that courts should recognize two
new categories of persons who will be bound by a judgment: "Other plaintiffs who
must share in an earlier plaintiffs loss to a common defendant, and an offensive class
of 'other defendants' who must share in an earlier defendant's loss to a common
plaintiff"); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 5.05 & cmt.
a, n.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) (noting that another possible reform proposal is
to revise the rule of mandatory joinder); Note, supra note 4 (suggesting that either
complete mutuality for collateral estoppel or preclusion of relitigation of the issue once
the defendant has either won or lost is preferable to the current use of asymmetrical
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results is recognized, once litigation is seen as to a great extent a
matter of chance, then the unfairness of nonmutual collateral
estoppel is manifest.
The risk in litigation is much like the risk in a coin ffip, even
though the court system by a variety of mechanisms tries to resolve
disputes accurately, and even though each side tries by retention of
skilled counsel and by diligent preparation to make the odds as much
as possible favor it. In such a coin ffip you put up your money and
you abide by the result, win or lose. That seems fair. Now suppose
a bystander who has watched the coin flip but who has not risked his
cash were to approach the loser and say, "Pay me, too." Such a
demand would be laughed away, it is so obviously unfair. Yet such
demands are now commonly enforced under the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel.79
Nonmutual collateral estoppel fundamentally and unfairly
changes the risks in litigation. Consider first litigation generally,
then the changes made if estoppel is nonmutual.
In most litigation, what one party wins is what the other party
loses. Either plaintiff wins $Y and $Y is what defendant must pay,
or the plaintiff loses a claim of uncertain value and defendant is
relieved from the threat of liability for that claim. Even in an action
for an injunction, where the value of the injunction to the winning
party may be different from the injunction's cost to the losing
party,"0 it is still the same injunction at stake for both parties even
though their perceptions of its value may differ. Collateral estoppel
with mutuality merely increases the amount at stake. Instead of one
claim involving $Y, there may be X claims involving in total $XY
which may depend on the resolution of a particular issue, but there
is still the same proportion between the parties.
preclusion-if defendant wins, the issue can be relitigated in a subsequent case, but
if defendant loses, the issue is precluded from litigation).
79. Other commentators have criticized the unfairness of nonmutual collateral
estoppel. See Elvin E. Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel,
and Conflict of Laws, 44 TENN. L. REv. 927, 949 (1977); Ratliff, supra note 4, at
77-81; Ellis, supra note 44; Note, supra note 4; Steven C. Malin, Comment,
Collateral Estoppel: The Fairness Exception, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 959, 988 (1988).
80. Compare the problem of valuing an injunction for purposes of determining
the amount in controversy in federal courts. 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3704 & n.18 (1985).
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Collateral estoppel without mutuality fundamentally changes the
situation. The defendant might be faced with many claims involving
the same issue asserted in many different civil actions by many
different plaintiffs. In each civil action the most defendant can win
is release from the threat of liability for the plaintiff's claim in that
action, but defendant may lose not merely the $Y paid to that
plaintiff but also the many claims asserted by similarly situated
plaintiffs able to invoke collateral estoppel if mutuality is not
required. Without mutuality, while the defendant can at most win
only the case at hand, defendant risks losing not only that case but
also all the cases involving an issue subject to estoppel. The
defendant thus may lose not only to the opposing party but also to
the kibitzers.
The other claimants able to invoke nonmutual collateral estoppel
are able to win without having risked anything. While such a result
might seem appropriate if we were confident the first result was
correct, such confidence cannot be justified. There is no fair claim
to such a windfall. The other claimants have done nothing to entitle
them to this benefit, nor has the common party committed any
wrong deserving such an imposition. With nonmutual res judicata,
by comparison, while the other defendants may have a relatively
weak claim to the doctrine's benefit, the common party's attempt to
do in multiple litigation what could have been done in one deserves
sanctions to discourage imposition of unnecessary costs on the courts
and society."'
That the result achieved by nonmutual collateral estoppel is
unfair is suggested by the rejection of similar results when Rule 23
on class actions was revised in 1966.2 The purposes of that
revision included eliminating one-way intervention in which
members of a spurious class would intervene if the class won but be
free to litigate separately if the class lost. That revision of the rules
required that class actions be binding whichever way they came out,
81. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17 (discussing the benefits of dropping
the mutuality requirement for res judicata).
82. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966)
(rejecting one-way intervention by potential class members in cases favorable to them
while not binding them. to unfavorable decisions); see also Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 385-86 (1967) (noting the criticisms that
were leveled against one-way intervention before Rule 23 was revised).
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not only if they resulted in a victory in favor of the class. To
tolerate nonmutual collateral estoppel is to resurrect the unfairness
the 1966 revision of the federal rules sought to inter.8 3
Thus nonmutual collateral estoppel cannot be justified either by
an expectation that the first case was correctly decided or by
considerations of fairness.
c. Litigation Efficiency?.-The goal of promoting litigation
efficiency might be invoked to justify nonmutual collateral estoppel.
The potential savings from nonmutual collateral estoppel may seem
clear: the common party's loss of the first case eliminates all future
cases.
Such a perception, however, is misleading. Two major factors
reduce the potential savings in litigation costs from the application
of nonmutual collateral estoppel. First, the savings may not be that
great. There is no savings if the common party wins. Even if there
is a loss by the common party, it will only eliminate issues, not
cases, and other issues are likely to remain. At least it will be
necessary to determine damages, and it may be necessary to
determine other issues affecting liability. With a trial thus still
necessary, the savings from estoppel on a few issues may be slight.
In contrast, nonmutual res judicata will eliminate the second case,
not merely issues in it. Second, nonmutual collateral estoppel has
costs. The effort needed in the second case to litigate whether to
apply the doctrine may be substantial." Claimants may hang back
from the first case, hoping to invoke the doctrine if the common
party loses, whereas without the doctrine they would have joined
forces in the first case, with a decision either way binding on all.
The common party is likely to litigate the first case more intensively
and extensively because of the exposure under nonmutual collateral
estoppel, and that effort likely will have to be matched by the
common party's first opponent.85
83. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d
358, 365-67 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that those who opt-out of a class action cannot
use offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel to claim the benefits of the class's victory).
84. See Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio
1983) (demonstrating the extent to which litigating the issue of nonmutual collateral
estoppel consumes judicial resources).
85. Id. at 982-83.
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Of course, there may be a great savings in litigation costs if the
common party is coerced in the early cases into abandoning a valid
position by fear of the disproportionate costs of the slight risk of
defeat being applied as nonmutual collateral estoppel in the later
cases. Reducing litigation by driving those with meritorious
positions from court, however, has little to commend it.
Possible savings from nonmutual collateral estoppel should be
weighed against other methods of obtaining greater efficiency. Five
suggestions follow. First, if claimants lose the advantage now
provided by nonmutual collateral estoppel, they might consolidate
several cases or agree with the common party to a test case which
might effectively resolve many similar cases. Second, some cases
might appropriately be resolved by class actions.8 6 Third, the
federal panel on complex litigation helps to simplify litigation of
cases pending in different federal trial courts by transferring related
cases pending in different federal district courts to one federal
district court for pretrial proceedings; 7 this procedure might be
extended to include trials as well as pretrial and to include state
cases."8 Fourth, some of the issues on which nonmutual collateral
estoppel might be invoked could perhaps instead be resolved as a
86. See, e.g. Ratliff, supra note 4, at 68-69; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for
Mass Torts, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a class action is appropriate for all
Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange to seek recovery for personal injuries from
the manufacturers). But cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for
Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a class action composed
of kin of victims of an airplane crash); Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38
(D.N.H. 1983) (holding that a suit could not be maintained as a class action to seek
recovery for injuries from DES).
87. See 28 U.S.C § 1407(a) (1982).
88. AMEIcAN LAW INSITrUTE, PRELMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION
238-39 (1987). It should be noted that there is substantial disagreement about the
virtues of greater required consolidation. Compare Thomas D. Rowe & Kenneth D.
Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 7 (1986) (urging the creation of new federal subject matter jurisdiction for
multiparty, multiforum litigation) with Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in
Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779 (1985) (arguing for an end to the
practice of ordering joint trials in mass tort cases). See also Sherman, Aggregate
Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LMG. 231 (1991) (arguing
that although aggregation is problematic, it offers a useful option in resolving mass
tort litigation). The problems with required consolidation are likely also to appear in
proposals to estop nonparties. See supra note 78.
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matter of judicial notice, if on balance the scientific evidence
although voluminous and complicated permits but one answer, or at
least excludes certain answers.89  Areas appropriate for such
treatment might include whether a company's products have certain
characteristics and whether those characteristics can cause certain
conditions. Fifth, many issues involving the application of the law
to fact or the evaluation of conduct which at times are treated as
issues of fact might instead be treated as issues of law, if the
circumstances in which they arise become common enough that a
rule of law becomes appropriate.9 Areas appropriate for such
treatment might include evaluating whether a particular manufactur-
ing process was negligent or unduly hazardous and whether
particular labeling constituted adequate notice. All five of these
approaches would have the advantage of applying whether or not the
common party prevailed; the judicial notice and the rule of law
approaches would also apply to others in the position of the common
party but not involved in this litigation. That is, precedent and
89. See Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D.
Minn. 1982) (noting that whether asbestos can cause asbestosis and mesothelioma "is
so firmly entrenched in the medical and legal literature that it is not subject to serious
dispute"). Cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-81
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (holding "Lite" as applied to beer
was a generic term and thus not a valid trademark, based on a "less complete record"
and judicial notice of the English language). That decision was applied as nonmutual
collateral estoppel in Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990,
996 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980). A fairer approach might
have been to have decided both cases as a matter of judicial notice.
90. See White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians v. Alexander, 683 F.2d 1129,
1133-35 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982) (deciding the issue of
whether an Indian tribe had been disestablished by an 1889 Congressional statute as
a matter of nonmutual collateral estoppel; this issue might better have treated the
matter as a question of law to be decided by precedent); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 123-26 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1881). Carr v. District
of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980), treated the issue of whether the United
States holds title to alleys in the District of Columbia as a matter of nonmutual
collateral estoppel, again an issue which would seem better decided as a matter of law
and precedent. See also Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242, 250 (E.D.
Tex. 1980) (holding that the unreasonably dangerous nature of asbestos has been
determined as a matter of stare decisis). The nonmutual collateral estoppel aspects of
Alexander and Carr may be inconsistent with United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154
(1984), discussed in part IV.F.
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judicial notice developed in litigation against General Motors might
also be applicable to litigation against Toyota.
Judicial efficiency might be promoted not merely by making one
case decide many, but also by allowing one case to influence many.
The Seventh Circuit has authorized the use of judgments as evidence
in patent cases,9" and similar use of antitrust judgments is autho-
rized by statute.92 Such use of judgments as evidence rather than
collateral estoppel might significantly increase judicial efficien-
cy. 9 3
Thus while there probably are savings in litigation costs from
the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel, these savings are
less than they might initially appear, and similar savings are possible
by other mechanisms. The savings from estoppel are too small to
justify the unfairness of the doctrine.
d. Need for Consistency?. -To require mutuality may be
to tolerate a greater number of inconsistent decisions by the courts,
with a consequent tarnishing of the courts' public image. Might this
concern justify nonmutual collateral estoppel? No, for three reasons.
First, it is not clear how much more inconsistency there will be.
By allowing nonmutual res judicata, as proposed above, the number
of inconsistent decisions when one has a single claim against
multiple parties will be reduced. Even in the situation of related
claims by unrelated parties, here called poly-claims, the encourage-
ment to consolidate litigation, provided by restoring the mutuality
requirement to collateral estoppel, may result in many circumstances
in which there is only one answer and thus will reduce inconsistency
in those circumstances where the common party wins the first case.
Similarly, the other methods discussed above of increasing efficiency
should result in fewer decisions and thus a reduced risk of inconsis-
tency.
Second, there will always be significant numbers of inconsistent
decisions so long as every person is entitled to a day in court under
91. See illinois Tool Works v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977); Federal Elec. Co. v. Flexlume Corp., 33
F.2d 412, 413 (7th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 590 (1929).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
93. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979
(1986) (suggesting various justifications for using judgments as evidence).
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the due process clause. A consequence of permitting a certain
margin for error by juries and trial judges is that the same case can
and will be decided either way. To restore the mutuality require-
ment to collateral estoppel is thus unlikely to increase dramatically
the total amount of inconsistency in the judicial system.
Finally, one must ask whether it is good for the courts to
pretend to have greater accuracy than they possess.94 In the long
run, institutions are likely to operate better with their flaws revealed
and subject to pressure for reform, than if they hide their flaws and
leave dissatisfaction to fester until the institution is thoroughly
deficient or its support gone. As John Stuart Mill wrote, the reason
for freedom of ideas is in part to permit the new to emerge, and in
part to preserve the strength of the old by periodically subjecting
them to challenge and reconsideration.95 Our courts do not seem
so frail that they must be treated as tender hothouse orchids; rather
they are mature trees able to withstand, perhaps by bending a little,
the fiercest gale. They can tolerate the relatively small amount of
inconsistency caused by restoring the mutuality requirement to
collateral estoppel. On the other hand, some courts may not be able
to tolerate image-promoting falsehood. A major assumption of
courts approving nonmutual collateral estoppel, an assumption that
may be present even if not stated, is that a fairly tried case necessar-
ily produces the right answer.96 That obviously erroneous97
assumption may have been induced in part by the various mecha-
nisms judges adopt which promote the courts' public image. One
reason to be careful about one's own image promotion is to keep
one's own head clear.
e. Miscellaneous. -Three possible justifications for
nonmutual collateral estoppel-that it might be justified by substan-
tive policies, that mutuality versus nonmutuality doesn't matter, and
that we don't want the common defendant who loses each case to
94. "Inconsistent results may be embarrassing to a degree, but it is much more
disastrous to pretend an infallibility which does not exist and to sacrifice justice, as
perceived by its victims, to a compulsion for tidiness." Greenebaum, supra note 17,
at 14.
95. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LEBERTY 15-52 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
96. See text accompanying notes 47-48.
97. See text accompanying notes 50-76.
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force each plaintiff seriatim to put on a case-may be briefly
addressed.
Could nonmutual collateral estoppel be justified by substantive
policies favoring the opponents of the common party? Probably not.
Because the doctrine applies in all substantive contexts, it seems
unlikely to be motivated by substantive concerns. The advantage to
the noncommon parties, and the disadvantage to the common party,
of nonmutual collateral estoppel increases with the number of
unrelated parties, again a factor which makes it unlikely that the
doctrine advances any substantive policy. The effect of nonmutual
collateral estoppel has other perverse aspects. It heavily favors the
first who settle (as they use the other claimants as leverage), but it
burdens those who litigate early (as the common party is likely to
put extra resources into the early cases because of the fear of losing
the remaining cases by estoppel). Whether it benefits those who
settle or litigate late depends on the outcome of the earlier cases.
One might ask whether the lack of a mutuality requirement to
collateral estoppel constitutes a serious problem. One might expect
that the first case tried, whichever way it goes, would tend to
influence settlements heavily.9" While that is true, having the force
of law behind one of the settling parties through nonmutual collateral
estoppel is likely to increase greatly that effect.99
Would restoring the mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel
in this context mean that after an airplane crash the manufacturer
could force each litigant to put on a case, despite the manufacturer's
loss of all previous cases? That would be a most unlikely possibili-
ty. Such a defense would run a serious risk of sanctions under Rules
11 and 37(c)"° after the first few losses. Surely plaintiffs' attor-
neys would not proceed seriatim but would rather assemble a few
large cases.01 As a practical matter, after a few cases the remain-
98. Craig R. Callen & David D. Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not To Praise It: An
Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 755, 768-69 (1980).
99. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in The
Shadow of The Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979)
(describing how legal rules create bargaining endowments).
100. See supra note 58 (discussing these rules).
101. See United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D. Nev.
1962), aff'd in part & modified in part sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
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der would settle. In other cases, such as asbestos litigation,
individual differences of period and type of exposure to the hazard,
differences in ages of the victims at exposure, differences in time
since the exposure, and differences in other health characteristics
would preclude either joinder or the application of nomnutual
collateral estoppel as it now exists, 1" so reinstating the mutuality
requirement would have no effect.
Thus offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel cannot be justified.
The acceptance of such estoppel has been based on a misunderstand-
ing of the nature of courts. Courts are used not because they are
accurate (on the contrary they appear often to be inaccurate), but
because they attempt to be fair and accurate and they are a reason-
able risk allocation mechanism. A process justified by fair risk
allocation cannot fairly be extended to others who risked nothing.
None of the arguments against mutuality is sufficient to overcome
this basic unfairness.
2. Multiple Defendants.-The preceding discussion of the
multiple claimant problem argued that nonmutual collateral estoppel
cannot be justified in that context. A similar problem is presented
when one faces multiple defendants, if one has separate but related
claims against each. This problem is likely to arise in litigation
about possible infringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
as well as in litigation about form contracts such as with employees
regarding secrecy or with franchisees. For example, the owner of
a patent bringing an action against an alleged infringer may meet a
defense that the patent is invalid or narrow in scope. That defense
might also be raised by other alleged infringers in other enforcement
actions. A successful assertion of such a defense in one action may
States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (after plane crash killing 49, 24 cases wound up in one
federal court and nine in another); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some
Problems of Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 469 (1960) (suggesting that, in
practice, mass disasters rarely produce many individual cases for trial, due to
consolidation and settlement).
102. See, e.g., Green, supra note 74, at 141. For similar reasons offensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel on the issue of causation of certain injuries in an airplane
crash was rejected in Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982), and on the issue of design defect and
negligence in the Dalkon Shield litigation in Setter v. A.H. Robins Co., 748 F.2d
1328 (8th Cir. 1984).
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be available under existing law as nonmutual collateral estoppel in
other enforcement actions where that defense is raised.
A mental picture may be helpful. The litigation after an
airplane crash might be viewed as a core of the airline (possibly with
additional defendants) surrounded by passengers or their representa-
tives asserting claims. This is the classic context for offensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel: a target at which many arrows or
claims are aimed. Consider now the patent holder beset by multiple
infringers. The picture is basically the same. There is a core of the
patent holder surrounded by infringers. The only difference is that
now the arrows point out from the core rather than in towards it.
Like the multiple claimant problem, this multiple defendant
problem exposes the common party in each action to risk of losing
all the cases through nonmutual collateral estoppel while that party
is able to win at most only that one action. Like the common party
facing multiple claimants, the common party facing multiple
defendants has limited control over the forum. Each of the multiple
defendants can only be sued in courts satisfying personal jurisdiction,
subject matter jurisdiction, and venue requirements, only after that
defendant has acted and been discovered, and only before the statute
of limitations has run.
Unlike the situation which might permit the nonmutual res
judicata defense, where a party has essentially one claim which
might be asserted against several defendants (a mono-claim), here we
are concerned with separate claims for separate injuries against the
different defendants (poly-claims). Consider a typical mono-claim.
A person should have only one claim for the injuries that person
sustained in an automobile accident, even though several cars were
involved, and even though as to each car there are possible claims
against the car's driver, owner, manufacturer, and maintainer, and
the driver's employer. The additional defendants would not add to
one's recovery. Amounts collected from one defendant would
reduce collections from the others under a system of joint liability;
under proportionate liability, each would be liable for only that part
of the injury each caused. Contrast a typical poly-claim. Each
infringer (or group of cooperating infringers) inflicts a separate
injury. Each infringer is likely acting at a separate time and place
and each may infringe in a different way. Collections from one
infringer or group of infringers would not reduce amounts collected
from another. Although this second category has been considered
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merely defensive,"u much like the cases considered earlier where
one claim may be collected from several different parties," it
belongs instead with the cases normally classified as offensive in a
broader category of multiple separate but related claims between one
common core party and several unrelated parties, what this Article
proposes to call poly-claims. In neither the multiple claimant nor the
multiple defendant version of this category can nomnutual collateral
estoppel be justified.
C. Government Enforcement Actions
We now proceed to the third situation in which nonmutual
collateral estoppel has been applied: the first litigation is a govern-
ment enforcement action, the second a private civil action. It is
useful to distinguish three types of government enforcement actions:
criminal prosecutions, actions where the government seeks relief for
private parties, and other government actions.
1. Criminal Prosecutions. -There seems little risk of unfairness
in applying estoppel from a criminal conviction to a civil action.
The unusual procedural safeguards for the accused in a criminal
prosecution make an erroneous conviction much less likely than an
erroneous civil decision. The risk of imprisonment, fine, and harm
to reputation following a criminal conviction assure that the accused
has full incentive to put on the best defense possible. Estoppel in
civil cases may even be applied from guilty pleas in criminal cases,
contrary to the rule that limits estoppel from civil cases to issues
actually litigated. 5 There would be no estoppel from an acquittal,
because the government's inability to sustain the very high burden
103. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.
S. 313 (1971).
104. See supra part 1IT.A.
105. Compare Pilkay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61 T.C.M. (CCH)
2281 (1991) (Pilkay estopped from denying he misappropriated funds after pleading
guilty in state court) and Rodriguez v. Schweiger, 796 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Rodriguez estopped in civil rights case from claiming that the police fired first shot
after pleading guilty to attempted murder), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987) with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982) (providing an exception to the
rule that limits estoppel from civil cases to issues actually litigated where, for
example, the party "sought to be precluded.., did not have an adequate opportunity
or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action").
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of proof in criminal cases of "beyond a reasonable doubt" does not
predetermine the result in civil litigation where the burden is
generally the much lower "more likely than not."'" Because the
special protections for the accused in criminal trials make estoppel
based on criminal cases fundamentally different from estoppel based
on civil cases, estoppel from criminal convictions are proper without
regard to mutuality.
2. Relief for Private Parties.-There are difficult problems in
the application of collateral estoppel, from actions in which the
government seeks relief for private parties, to litigation in which
those private parties seek similar relief. For example, racial
discrimination in housing might lead to both government enforce-
ment actions and private actions for similar relief. Normal doctrines
of privity might apply, because the government to a significant
extent represents the private beneficiaries of its enforcement action,
and because the private beneficiaries have a substantial interest in the
government's action."°7 If privity is determined to be satisfied,
then the private litigants would be bound by the government's
defeats as well as its victories. Unless legislation clearly provides
differently, our tradition of one-bite-at-the-apple would suggest that
the defendant should not be exposed in two cases to the risk of
having to provide the same remedy to the same people, a loss in
either proceeding being decisive, nor should plaintiffs have two
opportunities to obtain the same relief, a win in either case being
adequate.
That the legislature intended to increase the chances for private
recovery by providing for government enforcement action should not
without more imply rejection of the one-bite-at-the-apple norm.
Having the government action be binding on those it attempts to
benefit seems particularly appropriate where the government seeks
relief such as an injunction or receivership, where it is clear that
there will be but one remedy (two injunctions or receivers would
risk imposing incompatible obligations on defendant). On the other
hand, the government is pursuing general enforcement policies and
its own political goals, not merely representing the beneficiaries, and
106. See supra note 2.
107. See supra note 2 and infra note 143 (discussing privity).
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the beneficiaries have no right to intervene in or control the
government's action. If we are unwilling to bind private litigants by
the government's defeats, then the preceding analysis suggests it is
unfair to allow private litigants to invoke government victories.
3. Other Government Actions.-The weakest case for estoppel
is where the government is seeking only civil penalties. Here the
defendant lacks the extra safeguards available in a criminal prosecu-
tion, and here it is hard to argue that the government is in privity
with the private litigants because the government is not seeking relief
for the private litigants' particular benefit."' 8 The case for estoppel
is weaker still if the action for a civil penalty is conducted in a
special proceeding lacking the normal procedural protections of civil
litigation. °9
This section has argued that in no situation is nonmutual
collateral estoppel from civil litigation appropriate. Similar or better
results may be obtained in appropriate areas, however, by applying
nonmutual res judicata or by making the estoppel mutual.
IV. How the Law Went Astray
How did the law get into this position of rejecting mutuality for
collateral estoppel, yet requiring it for res judicata? The purpose of
this historical analysis is to show the very shaky foundations
supporting the now-widespread rejection of the mutuality require-
ment for collateral estoppel, thus indicating that the policies
108. Cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-69 (1989) (holding that white
firemen are not bound by earlier litigation between city and black firemen about
affirmative action). Section 108 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)(2)(n)), amended section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000-(e)(2), to preclude challenge to litigated or consent decrees in employment
discrimination cases by those who had actual notice and opportunity to be heard.
109. Administrative determinations are often given res judicata and collateral
estoppel effect by courts absent contrary legislative intent. See, e.g., University of
Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986). Arbitration may or may not produce collateral
estoppel effect. See Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using
Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REv. 29 (1988); G. Richard
Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35
UCLA L. REV. 623 (1988).
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discussed above favoring the mutuality requirement should be
implemented notwithstanding the doctrine of stare decisis.
A. Jeremy Bentham
Although there are some earlier authorities, the first major
attack on mutuality is the famous quotation from Jeremy Bentham
that mutuality is "a maxim which one would suppose to have found
its way from the gaming table to the bench."' 10 Use of this
quotation is misleading on two counts.
First, the quotation did not address the use of judgments as
estoppel but merely as evidence, a far different subject.11' The
initial sentence of the paragraph containing the quoted sentence
states, "Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence
against a stranger, the contrary judgment shall not be evidence for
him. "112
Second, the words are not Bentham's but merely those of his
editor. That editor was John Stuart Mill, certainly a distinguished
scholar in his own right, but he wrote those words when he was at
most twenty-one years of age.1 Ten years later he apologized for
"the air of confident dogmatism perceptible in some of his notes and
additions" 1 4 to Bentham's work, perhaps referring to the language
quoted above.1"'
110. JEREMY BENTHAM, 6 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, Chap. XII, § 5,
at 579 (Mill ed. 1827), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM at 171 (New
York, Russell & Russell, Inc., John Bowring ed., 1843). Mill's name as editor
appears at the end of the preface in the 1827 edition (id. at xvi) but not in the Bowring
edition. Citations to this quotation from Bentham appear in several leading cases. See
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 322-23
(1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
934 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942).
111. See Motomura, supra note 93, at 980.
112. BENTHAM, supra note 110, at 579.
113. Mill lived from 1806 to 1873, so he was 21 years old when Rationale of
Judicial Evidence was published in 1827, and may have been even younger when the
words were written. Bentham lived from 1748 to 1832, and was thus 79 years old
(and five years from death) when Mill's edition was published, so he may not have
given it careful attention.
114. 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 203 (New York, Russell & Russell,
Inc., John Bowring ed., 1843).
115. Id. at 170. The preface notes, "The papers, from which the work now
[18271 submitted to the public has been extracted, were written by Mr. Bentham at
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Thus Bentham provides no effective opposition to mutuality of
collateral estoppel, and to rely on (then) young Mill is to lean on at
best a slender reed.
B. Bernhard v. Bank of America
Although there are earlier cases, the landmark case rejecting the
mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel is Bernhard v. Bank of
America."6 This case applied nonmutual collateral estoppel, from
an estate's beneficiaries' unsuccessful attempt to charge the adminis-
trator with misappropriation of the estate's funds, to defeat the
beneficiaries' action against the bank which had honored the
administrator's transfer of funds. The opinion is highly questionable
authority because it departs from normal judicial processes, its
"holding" was not necessary to decide the case as the same result
would have been reached under well-established doctrine, it confuses
terminology, and it improperly uses authority.
There is no hint in the record of this case prior to the California
Supreme Court's decision that the requirement of mutuality for
collateral estoppel was in question.117 Our respect for our highest
courts should not blind us to the importance of having advocates
attempt to persuade and educate trial and intermediate appellate
courts, and of having the judges of those courts wrestle with the
issues, each learning from what has gone before. The opinion
states, "No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the
requirement of mutuality,"11 yet no realistic opportunity was
various times, from the year 1802 to 1812." THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM,
supra note 113, at 201. Later the preface states:
[M]t has sometimes (though but rarely) occurred, that while one topic was treated
several times over, another, of perhaps equal importance, was not treated at all.
Such deficiencies it was the wish of Mr. Bentham that the Editor [Mill] should
endeavor to supply. In compliance with this wish, some cases of the exclusion
of evidence in English law, which were not noticed by Mr. Bentham [thus Mill
is using his own thoughts, not unwritten thoughts of Bentham, to fill the gaps in
Bentham's writing], have been stated and commented upon in the last chapter of
the book [from which the quotations in the text above are taken].
Id. at 202.
116. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
117. Copies of the record are available in the author's office and at the University
of California Hastings College of the Law Library.
118. 122 P.2d at 895.
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provided for plaintiff's counsel to produce that justification." 9 An
attorney who suddenly is hit by an unprecedented and unargued
position in the highest appellate court available is at a serious
disadvantage in trying to resuscitate his case in a petition for
rehearing.
Moreover, even had the attorney persuaded the court to
reconsider whether mutuality should be required for collateral
estoppel, it is still most unlikely that plaintiff could have prevailed
on the merits, as the case fit within both well-established exceptions
to the mutuality requirement for res judicata. 120 Had the bank
been held liable to the estate's beneficiaries for improperly paying
the estate's former administrator, the bank would normally seek
reimbursement from the former administrator who had wrongfully
received the funds. But the former administrator had already been
exonerated. Thus the case is an example of the exception to
mutuality for res judicata when the first case discharges a person
owing a duty of indemnity and the second case is brought against the
person entitled to indemnity. The case is also an example of the
other exception to mutuality for res judicata, in which the first case
exonerates one whose actions are the basis for imposing liability on
another in the second case. Thus the rejection of mutuality for
collateral estoppel was not needed to decide the case.
Why did the court not, as this Article suggests, eliminate the
mutuality requirement for res judicata rather than for collateral
estoppel? There may have been a problem with the terminology.
Although the concepts of "res judicata" and "collateral estoppel" are
clearly different and are recognized as such in the opinion, the term
"res judicata" was applied to both.' Such minor linguistic
119. Note that while the opinion suggests ignorance of any reason to require
mutuality, it presents no reasons for dropping mutuality.
120. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing traditional
exceptions to mutuality of res judicata).
121. "The doctrine ofresjudicata precludes parties ... from relitigating a cause
of action . . . . Any issue necessarily decided in such litigation is conclusively
determined as to the parties . . . if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit . .. ."
Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 894 (citations omitted). The first sentence deals with res
judicata, the second with collateral estoppel. Following the quote, the first sentence
deals with collateral estoppel, the next with res judicata, again without distinguishing
the concepts. This confusing use of terms is hardly surprising, because "res judicata"
has traditionally been used to refer to both "res judicata" and "collateral estoppel" as
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problems may at times impede analysis. In this case, all the
exceptions to mutuality discussed were exceptions to res judicata, not
to collateral estoppel, but this important point was hidden by using
the first term to cover both topics.
One might criticize the court's use of authority. It cites
Bentham's famous comparison of mutuality to the gaming table,
122
not noting that the passage referred to the admissibility of judgments
as evidence rather than to collateral estoppel, not noting that the
passage was arguably written not by Bentham but by a youthful John
Stuart Mill. The court's statement that "The commentators are
almost unanimously in accord" -with abandoning the mutuality
requirement is followed by a string of citations, all but one of which
are to student comments and the other is to an article by a man
admitted to the bar only three years before the article was pub-
lished."z The court overlooked such authorities as the leading
works on evidence and judgments,"2 a law review article by the
former chief justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court' (all cited
earlier in the opinion for other purposes), and the drafts of the first
Restatement of Judgments (circulated the year before Bernhard was
decided),'126 all of which endorsed the mutuality requirement.
used here, and because the term "collateral estoppel" was just being brought into use
in this area by the authors of the RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1942). See Austin
W. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 nn.4-5 (1942).
122. 122 P.2d at 895.
123. Id. The only non-student work cited is Berkeley Cox, "Res Adjudicata:
Who Entitled To Plead, 9 (N.S.) VA. L. REG. 241 (1923). Cox was admitted to the
bar in 1920. Alumni Directory, Washington & Lee Univ., THE AMERICAN BAR
ANNUAL DIRECTORY 1096 (James C. Fifield ed., 1924); 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL
LAW DIRECTORY 92 (1933).
124. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 524 (15th ed. 1892)
(this passage is retained in two later editions of the work edited by John H. Wigmore
and William Draper Lewis); 2 HENRY C. BLACK, BLACK ON JUDGMENTS § 548 (2d
ed. 1902), 1 A.C. FREEMAN, FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS §§ 428-29 (5th ed. 1925).
125. Robert von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1929).
126. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 416 (Tentative draft No. 2, 1941).
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C. Brainerd Currie
The most prominent academic supporter of the requirement of
mutuality for collateral estoppel was Professor Brainerd Currie.'27
He discussed the problem of the multiple claimant anomaly, 128
using a hypothetical involving a train wreck injuring fifty people.
Currie demonstrated why, after the railroad successfully defended
twenty-five actions, it should not be estopped in the remaining
actions if it loses a single action.129 Currie then asked why we
would accept a defeat by the railroad in the first action, because that
defeat too could be aberrational. Currie then suggested a reluctance
to enforce nonmutual collateral estoppel against one who lacked the
initiative in the first case because of the disadvantage of having one's
opponent pick the forum and time for litigation. Here Currie was'
correct in seeing the problem, but incorrect in diagnosing it.
The problem is not one of lack of initiative but rather in the
nature of the litigation. A problem, like the multiple claimant
anomaly, may also be presented to a party having the initiative.
Like a common party facing multiple related but separate claims
asserted by unrelated parties (the multiple claimant anomaly), a
common party asserting such claims against unrelated parties (e.g.,
the patent holder beset by infringers) has a serious problem if
mutuality is not required. A loss of the first case entails for each the
risk of loss of all the cases, yet no more can be won than the one
127. Currie, supra note 76.
128. The multiple claimant anomaly had been raised earlier by Warren A. Seavey
in RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 416 Note to Members (Proposed Final Draft, Part
II, 1942) and Res Judicata with Reference to Persons neither Parties nor Privies-Two
California Cases, 57 HARV. L. REV. 98, 104-05 (1943).
129. An otherwise fascinating analysis of mutuality assumed that under
nonmutuality any loss by the common party would forfeit all remaining cases, even
if the loss were preceded by many wins. Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the
Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. REV. 612, 641-45 (1978).
Although a few cases so hold, they seem inconsistent with Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979). See, e.g., Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
713 F.2d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems.
Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376-80 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Michigan note's error is
repeated in Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of
Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1941 (1992).
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case currently being litigated. That one-sided risk of loss cannot be
justified."
While the initiative in litigation may of course be useful, Curie
may have exaggerated its importance. First, a plaintiff's control of
the litigation may be less than Currie thought. The plaintiff has the
advantage of choice of forum, but only from among those satisfying
jurisdiction and venue requirements, and this choice may be
overcome by forum non conveniens or a transfer under §
1404(a).13 1  The plaintiff may pick the time, but only from the
period begun by the claim accruing and ended by the statute of
limitations or laches. The plaintiff may pick the parties, but the
court may require additional parties under Rule 19, the opponent
may add parties under Rules 13(h) and 14, other persons may
intervene under Rule 24, and the case may be consolidated with
others under Rule 42. Second, surely any decent procedural system
will be generally fair both to plaintiffs and defendants.132
Thus Currie's criticism was rejected, even though it was not the
criticism which was invalid, but only Currie's explanation of his
criticism. Unfortunately those who rejected Currie's explanation
(including at a later date even Currie himself)13 3 did not probe
deeper to seek a better explanation.
D. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories
The United States Supreme Court first gave its blessing to
nonmutual collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation.3 1 This case, like
130. See supra part IH.B.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.").
132. Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329, 337 (Or. 1970) ("[T]here would be
something radically wrong with our system of justice if we were required to start
basing rules of law upon the proposition that defendants do not, on the average, have
a fair opportunity to litigate relevant issues.").
133. Brainerd Currie, Cvil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25,
31 (1965) (abandoning his earlier-proposed "initiative" test in favor of a "particular-
ized inquiry" whether the party "in the former action had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate" to control excesses of nonmutual collateral estoppel).
134. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971).
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Bernhard,135 presented a substantial departure from normal judicial
processes. The Court also seemed to have misunderstood the
litigation posture of the case before it, and to have over-estimated
the accuracy of court determinations.
Neither party had recommended rejecting the doctrine of
mutuality until prodded to do so by the Court in questioning at oral
argument. 136 Once again a major decision on nonmutual collateral
estoppel would be made by a court lacking the education normally
provided by the parties in our adversary system, and a top appellate
court would decide a case without the normal education and
development provided by having the contention made, opposed, and
decided in the trial court and intermediate appellate court.
The Court saw the case as just another defensive case, using
Currie's framework, and so did not go into the problem of the
multiple claimant anomaly. The Court apparently did not understand
that the patent case it was deciding was the litigation equivalent of
the multiple claimant problem.13 1
The Court, in arguing for nonmutual collateral estoppel,
presumed that the first case was correctly decided, and if that were
indeed true it would constitute a powerful argument for applying
nonmutual collateral estoppel, but of course, as discussed above, the
chances were too great that the first case was not correctly decided.
The case before the Court involved an earlier determination by one
federal district court that a patent was invalid, followed by a
different federal district court in the case on appeal having found the
patent valid. 3' No reason is apparent why the first decision
should be preferred to the second; on the contrary, the education of
both sides from the first case might lead one to prefer the second.
E. Parklane Hosiery
Almost a decade later the United States Supreme Court again
considered nonmutual collateral estoppel, this time in Parklane
135. See supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
136. Blonder-Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 319-21.
137. Id. at 330 ("But the case before us involves neither due process nor
'offensive use' questions.").
138. See University of Ill. Found. v. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., 402 U.S. 313,
314-17 (1971).
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Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 139  Here, unlike Bernhard and Blonder-
Tongue, the litigants and the lower courts addressed the subject.
Unfortunately, the attention of all-litigants, lower courts, and the
United States Supreme Court-was focused on another issue.
Although the case has a very nice discussion of the policies underly-
ing collateral estoppel, encouraging litigation efficiency and assuring
fairness to the litigants, 4 ' the attention of all was focused on the
question of whether nonmutual collateral estoppel from an equitable
action to a legal one violates the constitutional right to jury trial. 141
This question was an offshoot of earlier debates in the Court over
the right to jury trial in actions with both legal and equitable
elements. The author of the principal dissent in some of those
cases142 was at last in Parklane able to write for the majority, and
a near unanimous majority at that. Because of the focus on the right
to jury trial, the nonmutual collateral estoppel analysis again
suffered.
A more thorough nonmutual collateral estoppel analysis would
have considered at least the following three major points.
First, did the case even concern a lack of mutuality? 43 There
139. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
140. Id. at 329-31.
141. Id. at 333. See Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1971); David L.
Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trials in Civil Cases: A Comment
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1971).
142. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 543 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
143. One comment, "had the SEC lost in the first action, the private party would
not have been precluded from relitigating the issue," cites no authority. Mark J.
Stepaniak, Recent Case, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 611, 621 n.69 (1979). Cases in other
areas have split on allowing collateral estoppel from the government's loss against a
private litigant. Compare Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.) (denying collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 994 (1975) and Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203 (2d
Cir. 1972) (denying collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973) with
Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.) (allowing
collateral estoppel), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977) and Holt Hauling &
Warehousing Sys., Inc. v. Rapistan, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978), and
Roode v. Michaelson, 373 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (allowing collateral
estoppel). Cf. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975)
(litigation by a state agency is binding on a county). See generally WRIG-T ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 4458 (discussing nonparty preclusion problems arising "from the
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is an argument that the private litigants were in privity with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") which litigated the
first case. Those private litigants even more than other members of
the public were arguably represented by the SEC because the SEC
was seeking relief to their direct financial benefit, in fact essentially
the same relief as was being sought in the private action, and those
represented in the prior action are among those classically found to
be in privity.'" It is noteworthy that the case involved an attempt
by the SEC to obtain equitable relief including an injunction and the
appointment of a special counsel. Surely there will be only one
injunction and one special counsel in such a case to avoid subjecting
the defendant to incompatible duties, and such a result can be
justified under Rules 19 and 24145 when the private litigants are not
allowed to be -parties only if the SEC is representing them.'46 It
is unfortunate that this case, in which a government agency's
enforcement action on behalf of private litigants was allowed to estop
those litigants, has been treated as authority for the far different
problem presented when one claimant's success is invoked by others
as offensive nonmu'tual collateral estoppel.
Second, the Court said that the case had been thoroughly tried
because it involved a four-day trial. The trial, however, was on a
preliminary injunction with which the merits were consolidated,'47
an authorized procedure, but one whose acceleration may impose
some costs in accuracy. A four-day trial would seem somewhat
abbreviated by modem securities litigation standards. Thus the
Court's conclusion about the thoroughness of the trial is question-
able.
capacity to litigate public questions and the often uncertain divisions between public
questions and private rights").
144. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
145. Rule 24(a)(2) denies intervention of right if "the applicant's interest is
adequately represented." Rule 19, requiring joinder of parties under certain
circumstances, does not have an express exclusion of those already adequately
represented, but it would seem highly unlikely that Rule 19 would be read to require
joinder of one who had no right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).
146. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1963)
(denying- private parties intervention in government antitrust actions because the
government adequately represents them).
147. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477,
479 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Finally, it is not clear who won the first case. True, the SEC
won a declaratory judgment that the proxy solicitation had been false
and misleading, but the SEC failed in its attempts to enjoin the
merger or to have a special counsel appointed. On balance that
looks like a mixed result, probably tilting somewhat against the
SEC. Unless the SEC did win, however, there is no basis for
applying nomnutual collateral estoppel against the SEC's opponent
when the second case comes along. 148
F. United States v. Mendoza
When in United States v. Mendoza49 the Court finally did
consider nonmutual collateral estoppel in a case thoroughly briefed
and argued by the parties, fully considered by the lower courts, and
free of other major distracting issues, the Court held the doctrine
inapplicable: offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel could not be
applied against the United States government. Although many
aspects of the case were peculiar because the target of nonmutual
collateral estoppel was the United States government, some of the
points the Court makes would be equally applicable to a private
litigant exposed to (or asserting) multiple related claims involving
unrelated parties. 150
Thus although the clear weight of authority rejects the mutuality
requirement for collateral estoppel, that authority cannot withstand
careful scrutiny.
148. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines Ltd., 346 F.2d
532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 893 (1966); Taylor v. Hawkinson, 306
P.2d 797, 799 (Cal. 1957).
149. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
150. The Court's concern about the government's huge geographic breadth and
involvement in many trials and appeals would apply to many large private litigants,
although other points such as the government's concern about conserving judicial
resources and the change in policies caused by elections would not. Mendoza has
been applied to litigation against state governments. Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 768 F.2d 1558, 1578 (11th Cir. 1985). Cf. Atwell v. Blackburn,
800 F.2d 502, 509 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (stating that
"Mendoza... appear[s] to prohibit nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel against
governmental parties in habeas corpus review of criminal cases"), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 920 (1987).
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V. Conclusion
Nonmutual res judicata should be implemented because it is both
fair and efficient. Nonmutual collateral estoppel in civil cases
should be rejected, because even where it might be fair and efficient
nonmutual res judicata is more so, and because in other areas it is
unfair. The authority in favor of nonmutual collateral estoppel is,
upon careful examination, far weaker than it might initially appear,
so weak that even at this late date reconsideration of the question
whether to require mutuality for collateral estoppel should still be
open.
